Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon.  Research Papers in Law, 04/2012 by Smulders, Ben & Eisele, Katarina
Department of 
european LegaL StuDieS
Reflections on the Institutional 
Balance, the Community Method 
and the Interplay between 
Jurisdictions after Lisbon
Ben Smulders and 
Katharina Eisele
Research Paper in Law 04 / 2012  1 
 
European Legal Studies 
Etudes Européennes Juridiques 
 
 




Ben Smulders and Katharina Eisele 
 
 
Reflections on the Institutional Balance, the Community Method and the 

















European Legal Studies/Etudes Européennes Juridiques 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Brugge, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 47 72 61 | Fax +32 (0)50 47 72 60 
E-mail law.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu   2 
Reflections on the Institutional Balance, the Community Method and the 
Interplay between Jurisdictions after Lisbon 
 





Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU 
treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order 
to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign 
debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the 
“renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the 
European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such 
a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why 
would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of 
European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics 
emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation 
states.
1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national 
forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union 
that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon 
created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the 
Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU 
legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the 
development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the 
current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This 
interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a 
genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.    
 
                                                            
(*)The authors are, respectively, Principal Legal Advisor and Trainee in the Legal Service of the 
European Commission. Katharina Eisele is also a PhD candidate at Maastricht University. The 
opinions expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European 
Commission. The article is based on Ben Smulders’ contribution to the conference “The Institutional 
System of the Union Two Years after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty: Towards a New 
Balance?” organised at the College of Europe on 21 November 2011 in Bruges, Belgium. 
1 Herman van Rompuy, “Non pas renationalisation de la politique européenne, mais européisation de la 
politique nationale”, speech delivered in Paris on 20 September 2010, p. 2.   3 
2. Keeping a Balance: The Union’s Institutional System 
 
The EU is an entity of a sui generis  nature, to which its Member States have 
transferred powers with the aim of creating an economic and political Union. The way 
these powers are divided between and exercised by the Union institutions has for 
long occupied the minds of policy makers, academics and civil society alike. In 2001, 
at the Laeken summit, the European Council highlighted the democratic challenge 
the EU was faced with and the ensuing need to redefine its institutional balance on 
the eve of enlargement process which would virtually double the number of its 
members.
2 The European Council made clear that the EU’s legitimacy was based on 
its democratic values, its objectives, the powers it holds and the instruments it had at 
its disposal – as well as its democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. At the 
same time, however, it pointed out that the democratic legitimacy and transparency 
of three of its institutions, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission, needed to 
be reinforced, and the question was raised how the balance and reciprocal control 
between the institutions could best be ensured.
3 Almost a decade later and despite 
two European Conventions and three IGCs, it was Chancellor Merkel who repeated 
the imperative necessity to establish a functioning and balanced institutional system 
in the Union when she delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges in 2010.
4 She 
emphasised the importance of the people's support for Europe, including the EU 
institutions. In her view Europe needed institutions which rendered it capable of 
acting and she noted that, after the new institutional framework introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, “we face the question of how we can better shape the interplay with 
the institutions.”
5  
2.1. The Concept of Institutional Balance  
Political scientists have in general perceived the concept of institutional balance as a 
dynamic one that explains the relative power positions of the EU institutions in 
respect to one another throughout the European integration process: the original bi-
polar nature of the EEC that only vested the Council and the Commission with real 
powers developed gradually into a complex power structure that has integrated the 
European Parliament today as an equal co-legislator in most fields, and in which the 
                                                            
2 See Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union (Annex I) of the Presidency Council 
Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14-15 December 2001.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Angela Merkel, speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of 
Europe in Bruges, Belgium, on 2 November 2010, p. 5. 
5 Ibid.    4 
European Council claims to be the de facto  executive  –  or at least the “policy-
steering” power.
6  It has been asserted, however, that the image of an institution 
changes depending on which aspect is in the focus of interest, in other words, it is 
decisive whether one endeavours to evaluate for instance the effectiveness or the 
accountability that an institution displays.
7  In light of  this rationale it has been 
contended that it is difficult to pinpoint a clear notion of institutional balance within the 
Union’s political system, and that “the phrase ‘institutional balance’ is favoured by 
practitioners but absent from the academic commentary, which recognises more 
explicitly the absence of clear institutional design in the EU.”
8  
 
Against this background, the authors take the view that it is more useful to define the 
concept of institutional balance as the legal principle according to which the EU 
institutions have to act within the limits of their respective powers as provided for by 
the Treaty.
9 In this regard, it has been highlighted that the Court has used the latter 
principle as a substitute for the principle of separation of powers, which is concerned 
with the protection of individuals against the abuse of power in the reasoning of 
Montesquieu.
10  As opposed to this, the principle of institutional balance as legal 
principle, to which the Court of Justice referred for the first time in Meroni in 1958, 
entails that it is upheld as long as every institution does not exceed its respective 
powers to the detriment of others.
11 This appreciation of institutional balance is thus 
essentially normative and concerned with the extent and the limitations of the 
competences of each institution as defined by the Treaties; Article 13 (2) TEU 
confirms this explicitly under the Lisbon regime. As a result, the objective of keeping 
an institutional balance among the Union institutions very much depends on how the 
decision-making within the EU takes place, which in turn depends on which powers 
are allocated to each EU institution.  
2.2. The Community Method and its Limits: Time for the Union Method? 
The Community method has played a key role in the development of the Union as it 
stands today. In 2007, in light of the non-adoption of the EU Constitution, the Treaty 
                                                            
6 See in this regard “Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance”, 15 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions (2002), 309-412. 
7 Helen Wallace, “The Council: An Institutional Chameleon?” 15 Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration and Institutions (2002), 325-344, p. 327; “An ever mighty European Council – 
some recent institutional developments”, Editorial, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009), 1383-
1393. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jean-Paul Jacqué, “The Principle of Institutional Balance”, 21 Common Market Law Review (2004), 
383-391. 
10 Ibid, p. 384.   5 
of Lisbon has been labelled as the “return” to the Community method and has 
extended the said procedure to all important policy areas, including trade policy, 
agriculture and fisheries, and in the area of freedom, security and justice.
12  The 
notion of “return” does, however, not adequately reflect the current state of play. 
Rather, the legal framework under the Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced the application 
of the Community method for a considerable number of policy fields, and has thereby 
contributed to achieving a new institutional balance in the Union.  
 
The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, emphasised the 
importance of the Community method in relation to EU action in the field of economic 
governance with a view to tackle the financial and economic crisis in Europe in 
February of 2012. He described the Community method as unprecedented when 
compared to other methodologies stating that “the very term evokes the spirit of the 
European integration process. Its origins”, he explained, “are to be found in the 
speeches of the Founding Fathers, and in the texts of the Paris and Rome 
Treaties.”
13 Which elements make the Community method so important? First of all, 
the Commission as “guardian of the Treaties” has the exclusive right of initiative, 
which provides it with the monopoly to commence the legislative procedure. In 
addition, the Commission has the power to amend and withdraw legislative 
proposals. These particular competences have put the Commission in the 
independent and unique position to identify the Union’s general interests for 
advancing the European project.
14 Second, the Community method is characterised 
by qualified majority-voting in the Council, which has been assessed as entailing a 
positive outcome for decision-making for the following reasons: not only does 
qualified-majority voting translate into a higher efficiency and promote the culture of 
compromise, but it also purports a symbolic meaning by abolishing the veto power of 
individual states.
15 Third, the European Parliament occupies a central position under 
the Community method, which adds to the democratic legitimacy of the Union as a 
whole. The European Parliament, the only directly elected parliamentary Union 
institution, is composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens.
16 Its powers have 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] ECR 133.  
12 See Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, “The Lisbon Compromise: A Synthesis between Community 
Method and Union acquis”, 31 Fordham International Law Journal (2007), 1143-1160. 
13  José Manuel Barroso, “European Governance and the Community Method”, speech delivered in 
Brussels on 28 February 2012, pp. 6-7. 
14 Paolo Ponzano et al., “The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion?”, 
Notre Europe Study No. 89, January 2012, p. 7.  
15 Yves Bertoncini/Valentin Kreilinger, “Seminar on the Community Method – Elements of Synthesis”, 
Notre Europe/BEPA, February 2012, pp. 5-6. 
16 Article 14 (2) TEU.   6 
once more been reinforced under the Lisbon regime that provides for the active – 
and in principle equal – participation of the European Parliament within the scope of 
the ordinary legislative procedure as laid down in Article 294 TFEU. From an initially 
consultative body, the European Parliament has over time developed into as co-
legislator holding seminal budgetary and legislative competences.
17  
Fourth, the Community method fully integrates the Court of Justice in Luxembourg as 
highest judicial authority in the Union that is vested with the task of safeguarding a 
uniform interpretation and application of Union law. Undeniably, the Court of Justice 
has contributed to furthering the European integration with its –  at times highly 
contested – case law.
18 Equally, it has ensured compliance with constitutional norms 
and thus guaranteed the effective enforcement and strengthening of the rule of law. 
These constituent elements shall ensure coherent and efficient action in a Union of 
27, which is in addition based on strengthened democratic legitimacy. The 
Commission's right of initiative, as well as the role that the latter institution takes from 
beginning to end in each decision-making process aims to guarantee coherence and 
the consideration of various interests. Finally, it is to be welcomed that the 
Community method renders the legislative procedure on Union level more 
democratic and legitimate by integrating all EU organs.  
 
The question arises how to proceed in cases in which the Community method 
reaches its limits. It was Chancellor Merkel who first came up with the so-called 
“Union method” stressing that a common position is pivotal  for a Europe of the 
citizens. In her view the Union method implied coordinated action in a spirit of 
solidarity at European level, in the area of one's competence but all working towards 
the same goal.
19 The President of the European Commission pointed out that the 
Union method “was seen as a way to weave together the intergovernmental and 
supranational elements of our decision-making process”, and opined that “[A]lthough 
this has been interpreted as an attempt to construct a new approach, I believe that 
the Chancellor was articulating what happens in the Union already. We operate with 
both processes. From time to time, the emphasis is placed on one more than the 
                                                            
17 Youri Devuyst, “The European Union’s Institutional Balance After the Treaty of Lisbon: ‘Community 
Method’ and Democratic Deficit’ Reassessed”, 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2008), 
249-325, pp. 306-308. 
18 Takis Tridimas, “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism”, 21 European Law Review (1996), 199-
210. 
 
19 Angela Merkel, speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of 
Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010, pp. 7-8.   7 
other.”
20 This demonstrates the practical approach that policy makers endeavour with 
a view to ensure that the Union remains capable of acting if the Community method 
cannot be applied.   
2.3. Grey Areas   
The new institutional framework displays, however, also weak points that can 
generate tensions among various stakeholders. This section outlines some 
controversial aspects that concern the implementation of principle of institutional 
balance since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. In the 
last two years genuine attempts have been made to develop a more stable 
framework for inter-institutional cooperation on the basis of inter alia a framework 
agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission
21,  Regulation 
(EU) No 182/2011 that provides for new rules for the control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of  its implementing powers
22  and the Common 
Understanding on the Use of Article 290 TFEU
23, and arrangements between the 
Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(the High Representative) and the Commission on EU statements in multilateral 
organisations. Despite these agreements uncertainties persist, because the 
institutions are still in the process of adapting themselves to the new setting. Some 
areas of conflict have emerged, which relate to the following subject matters.  
 
First, as regards co-decision it must be pointed out that despite many years of 
experience and a set of highly sophisticated treaty rules, virtually any legislative file 
of some importance is dealt with in trilogues towards the end of the first reading. This 
poses a problem of transparency as it means that such files are negotiated and 
decided behind closed doors on the basis of an exchange of non-papers  by the 
Council Presidency, EP rapporteurs, and the responsible Commissioner, assisted by 
officials of the three institutions.  
 
                                                            
20  José Manuel Barroso, “European Governance and  the Community Method”, speech delivered in 
Brussels on 28 February 2012, pp. 15-16. 
21  Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47. 
22 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
laying down the rules and the general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13. 
23  Council of the European Union,  “Common Understanding”  of 10 April 2011, document number: 
8753/11.   8 
Second, the Treaty of Lisbon has created –  admittedly an important institutional 
novelty – a hierarchy of norms.
24 The main purpose of this hierarchy was to enable 
the lawmaking authorities to concentrate on the political aspects of particular issues 
rather than on questions of detail, which it could delegate to the Commission or the 
Member States. It becomes clear, however, that the divide made by the Treaty of 
Lisbon between legislative and non-legislative acts is not very rational. In current 
practice, the European Parliament and the Council tend to distinguish between 
delegated acts and implementing acts not on the basis of clear normative criteria but 
political considerations, which may at times appear rather arbitrary.
25 Only the case 
law of the Court of Justice can provide for certainty in this regard.   
 
Third, one can observe a pluralisation of the EU executive structure, triggering 
delicate questions of scope and delimitation of powers. Today, executive power is 
vested with an ever-growing number of institutions and bodies: the European 
Council, the Council, the Commission, the High Representative seconded by the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Central Bank, and an 
exponentially increasing number of agencies, in particular in the area of financial 
services following the so-called de Larosière reform.
26 Traditionally, these agencies 
have the mandate to carry out tasks that require highly scientific and/or technical 
expertise. But practice, in particular in the area of financial services, shows that 
constantly attempts are made to explore the boundaries of the Meroni case law.
27 
Regarding the latter case it was elucidated that “[W]hile the Court did not exclude the 
‘possibility’ of delegating powers to a distinct body with separate legal entity (from 
this was deduced the power to establish an agency), it did exclude that the powers 
so delegated would involve discretionary power, a result the Court said was 
unacceptable since it  ‘replaces the choices of the delegator with those of the 
delegate (and) brings about an actual transfer of responsibility. Such a transfer of 
responsibility” – it was made clear – “interfered with the normal institutional balance 
                                                            
24 See Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
25  Consider for instance the different viewpoints of the Legal Services of the Council and the 
Commission; see also Council of the European Union, “Opinion of the Legal Service on the 
Application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU” of 11 April 2011, document number: 8970/11.  
26  See Report of the “High-Level Working Group on Financial Supervision in the EU”, chaired by 
Jacques  de  Larosière, Brussels, 25 February 2009; based on this report, the reform proposed 
measures relating to European economic governance to address the implications of the financial 
crisis. 
27 Hanna Sevenster and Ben Smulders, “Het Europese perspectief na Lissabon. De veranderende rol 
van de Nederlandse staatsinstellingen in de rechtsorde van de Europese Unie”, in: H.D. Tjeenk 
Willink et al. (eds.), De Raad van State in perspectief (Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag 2011), 
69-105, p. 88.    9 
foreseen by the Treaty.”
28  The  pluralisation of executive bodies is contrasted, 
however, by a hierarchisation, and therefore simplification, of the executive power at 
EU level which results directly from the fact that the European Council, in practice, 
considers its tasks “to provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its 
development” and “to define the general political directions and priorities” specified in 
Article 15 TEU as very broad.  
 
Fourth, the EU's external representation has raised highly contentious issues. In this 
regard it is crucial to point out that the Treaty of Lisbon was in fact supposed to 
render the Union's external representation more consistent and unified by providing 
the EU explicitly with legal personality and by creating the position of the High 
Representative who conducts the Union’s common foreign and security policy and 
the common security and defence policy, assisted by the EEAS.
29  The High 
Representative’s role has been called “double-hatted” seeing that the latter holds the 
combined post of the former High Representative for External Relations and the 
former Commissioner for External Relations.
30  The High Representative has to 
reconcile the Council's interests with the viewpoints of the Commission.
31  It still 
remains to be seen how and to which extent this “super-Minister of Strategic and 
Foreign Relations” accommodates both possibly conflicting positions.
32 The Union’s 
competence in matters of common foreign and security policy covers all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security.
33 Article 2 (4) TFEU 
stipulates that the Union is competent, in accordance with the TEU, to define and 
implement a common foreign security policy. P. Eeckhout emphasised that “the EU’s 
CFSP competence is neither exclusive nor shared, but rather in an undefined 
category of its own.” He argued that the CFSP was explicitly not defined as shared 
so as to prevent a pre-emptive effect.
34 While the Member States are under the 
obligation to support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly, and Council decisions taken on the basis of Article 28 (1) TEU commit 
the Member States in their positions and activities, the Treaty of Lisbon favours the 
                                                            
28 “An ever mighty European Council – some recent institutional developments”, Editorial, 46 Common 
Market Law Review (2009), 1383-1393, pp. 1389-1390. 
29 See Articles 3 (5), 18, 21, 27 (3) and 47 TEU.      
30 Christine Kaddous, “Role and Position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon”, in: S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Treaty of Lisbon: 
EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?  (Springer Verlag, Wien 2008), 205-221, p. 
209.  
31 Article 18 (4) TEU. 
32 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Of 'Mixity' and 'Double-hatting', EU External Relations Law Explained (Vossiuspers 
UvA, Amsterdam 2008), pp. 14-15.  
33 Article 24 (1) TEU.   10 
intergovernmental approach in that the new framework reinforces the Council's 
decision-making powers and simultaneously limits competences of the Commission, 
the EP and the Court.
35 The Council shall adopt the necessary decisions when “the 
international situation requires operational action by the Union.”
36  Such decisions 
are, as a general rule, taken by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously except where provided for otherwise.
37  
 
The ambiguity that surrounds the new Treaty rules on the Union’s external 
representation has led to some inter-institutional tensions. Indeed, the Commission is 
regularly faced with arguments concerning the EU's external representation which it 
considers to be incorrect. For instance, some Member States hold the view that when 
a matter is of shared competence, the EU and the Member States must act together 
and that then consensus/unanimity is required. However, in the Commission's view 
shared competence does not imply that the Union and the Member States must act 
together but that both, the Union and the Member States, can act with a view to 
adopting internal EU legislation as well as externally-oriented instruments.
38 This is 
notwithstanding the duty of sincere cooperation as specified in Article 4 (3) TEU 
according to which the Union and the Member States shall assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. Next, national authorities have 
advocated the common view that the Commission, the High Representative or the 
EU delegations can only speak on behalf of the Union if their statement was 
previously approved by the Member States. As has been indicated, the Union's 
external representation is ensured by the Commission, the High Representative and 
the delegations in line with Articles 15, 17, 27 TEU and Article 221 TFEU. Taking into 
account these legal bases transferring competence, the Member States’ stance of 
requiring their prior approval is legally wrong. To clarify, a statement of behalf of the 
EU can only be communicated to external partners if an established EU policy, an 
EU common position, or an EU strategy/EU concerted action exists. Provided that 
such an EU position does exist, the Commission, the High Representative or the 
delegations may deliver a statement of behalf of the EU after they have informed the 
Council giving it the time to comment; otherwise the statement can only be made if it 
is approved, or at least endorsed by the Council.
39  In defiance of these criteria, since 
                                                                                                                                                                      
34 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd ed. OUP, Oxford 2011), pp. 167-171.  
35 See Article 24 (3) TFEU and 28 (2) TEU.  
36 Article 28 (1) TEU. 
37  Article 31 (1) TEU.  
38 Article 5 (2) TEU and Article 2 (2) TFEU. 
39 See Article 16 TEU.   11 
November 2011, more than 50 EU statements have not been delivered in 
international fora.  
 
Lastly, collaboration between the Member States has also been intensified through 
the conclusion of arrangements outside the Treaty framework irrespective of whether 
the Treaty in fact contains provisions regulating the respective subject-matters. Such 
cooperation deals with the core of the discussions on the future of a “European 
economic government.” Recent examples are the Euro plus pact, the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Unified Patent Court, and the European Fiscal Compact. 
With respect to the latter instrument, Commission and European Parliament ensured 
the compatibility of the Fiscal Pact with Union law during the negotiations. However, 
some scholars
40  have indicated potential overlaps and inconsistencies of such 
intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms in respect to the EU legal order. In this 
context, the new rule of the Fiscal Compact that provides for a “reversed” qualified 
majority decision making needed in order to block Commission proposals made in 
the context of the so-called six pack, a collection of EU Regulations
41 based on inter 
alia Article 136 TFUE and aimed at reinforcing the Growth- and Stability Pact, was 
criticised. Likewise, objections were raised with regard to the role of the EU 
institutions under the Fiscal Compact without the participation of the EU-27, such as 
the special jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, as well as the right conferred to it to 
impose sanctions on the contracting parties. This recourse to the Court is based on 
Article 273 TFEU according to which the Court “shall have jurisdiction in any dispute 
between Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the 
dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the parties.” What does 
this provision imply? Usually, this clause can be found in international agreements 
between MS to stipulate the Court’s  competences for  disputes relating to the 
application and interpretation of the treaty. Under the Fiscal Compact, however, this 
power is defined very broadly to an extent that one could argues that “mimics” the 
infringement procedure under Article 260 TFEU.  
 
                                                            
40  With regard to the Fiscal Compact, see Anna Kocharov (ed.), “Another Legal Monster? An EUI 
Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty”, EUI Working Papers LAW 2012/09; in view of the European 
Stability Mechanism, see Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, “The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt 
Crisis”, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2011/2, pp. 13-16.  
41 See O.J. L306, 23.11.2011, pp. 1-47.   12 
3. The Interplay of National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice 
The interaction between the national courts of the Member States and the Court of 
Justice has in the past triggered heated debates about the principle of supremacy of 
Union law and constitutional pluralism. Before discussing current developments 
concerning the relationship between the aforementioned judicial actors in the Union, 
which all – some to a greater extent than others – postulate claims to power as 
ultimate arbiter, several general remarks on the theory of constitutional pluralism 
seem appropriate.   
3.1. Constitutional Pluralism in the Spotlight 
Constitutional pluralism has become a fashionable subject of research as apparent 
from recently published, rich academic literature on the topic  –  what does 
constitutional pluralism imply and what makes an extensive analysis of the notion so 
attractive? Originally, MacCormick provided the following definition of constitutional 
pluralism: “Where there is a plurality of institutional normative orders, each with a 
functioning constitution (at least in the sense of a body of higher-order norms 
establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers), it is possible that each 
acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none asserts 
or acknowledges constitutional superiority over another.”
42 In the EU setting, “[T]he 
idea of constitutional pluralism derived a lot of its initial focus and momentum from 
the circumstances of high-profile constitutional clashes over the implications of 
Europe’s supranational arrangements. The key sites of these clashes were the 
supreme or constitutional courts of the Member States.”
43 Arguably, the notion of 
constitutional pluralism emerged in the wake of the Maastricht judgment of 1993, in 
which the Bundesverfassungsgericht  (German constitutional court)  confirmed the 
compatibility of the German constitution with the Treaty of Maastricht while 
preserving itself the final authority to identify acts taken ultra vires.
44 Rather than 
considering constitutional pluralism merely as a reaction to the Maastricht judgment 
that aims to describe the phenomenon and tries to accommodate those competing 
constitutional claims, Maduro emphasised that a meaningful debate on constitutional 
conflicts of authority required a broader understanding of the nature and legitimacy of 
                                                            
42 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP, Oxford 1999), p. 104.  
43 Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context”, in: M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012), 17-37, 
p. 21. 
44 See Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds.), “Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism”, EUI Working 
Papers LAW 2008/21, pp. 9-12 and Julio Baquero Cruz, “The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the 
Pluralist Movement”, 14 European Law Journal (2008), 389-422; BVerfGE 89, 155 of 12 October 
1993; see also below Point 3.3.   13 
the European and national constitutions and their relationship with 
constitutionalism.
45 From an empirical perspective constitutional pluralism related in 
the scholar's view to “the current legal reality of competing constitutional claims of 
final authority among different legal orders (belonging to the same legal system) and 
the judicial attempts at accommodating them.”
46 From a normative viewpoint, Maduro 
assessed the competing constitutional claims underlying constitutional pluralism as 
equally legitimate or, at least – he specified – they cannot be balanced against each 
other at large.
47  De Búrca encapsulated the big picture of the ‘constitutional 
pluralism’  rationale  in plain terms as follows: “In sum, what unites the pluralist 
approaches to the international legal order is their emphasis on […] the existence of 
a multiplicity of distinct and diverse normative systems, and the likelihood of clashes 
of authority claims and competition for primacy in specific contexts. From the 
perspective of its advocates, the multiple pressure points of global legal pluralism, 
and the constant risk of mutual rejection of the authority claims of different functional 
or territorial sites, provide a more promising model for promoting responsible and 
responsive global governance than constitutional or cosmopolitan approaches which 
emphasize coherence or unity.”  The author made clear that “[R]obust pluralist 
approaches deny the possibility of a shared, universally oriented system of values 
and question the meaningfulness of the idea of an international community.”
48  
3.2. National Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure 
The well-known Solange I and II decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German 
constitutional court) handed down in 1974, and in 1986 respectively, in which the 
latter court reserved itself the right to scrutinise the compatibility of Union law with 
German legal norms, were indicatory for the relationship between some of the 
Member States’ constitutional courts and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg in the 
subsequent years.
49 How has the rather distant position of these constitutional courts 
meshed with the preliminary ruling procedure –  “the jewel in the Crown” of the 
                                                            
45 Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism”, in: M. Avbelj and J. Komárek 
(eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012), 
67-84, pp. 68-69. 
46 Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
47 Ibid., pp. 75-77. 
48 Gráinne De Búrca, “The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation”, in: G. De Búrca 
and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2012), 105-149, p. 130.  
49 BVerfGE 37, 271 of 29 May 1974; BVerfGE 73, 339 of 22 October 1986; on the theory of a – reversed 
– EU law ‘Solange doctrine’, which implies that outside the scope of the EU Charter Union citizens 
cannot invoke EU fundamental rights as long as it can be presumed that the essential content of the 
fundamental rights (Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte) is guaranteed in the Member State concerned, 
see Armin von Bogdandy et al., “Ein Rettungsschirm für europäische Grundrechte – Grundlagen   14 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice – which provides for a mechanism on the basis of 
which national courts can start a discourse with the Court of Justice regarding 
question on the scope of Union law if they consider the latter law to be in conflict with 
national law?
50 This question is in particular of interest considering that the procedure 
set out in Article 267 TFEU has allowed the Court to decide cases of major 
importance for the development of Union law, such as the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy. Considering the tension mentioned above, it comes at no surprise 
that constitutional courts have sometimes refrained from entering into direct dialogue 
with the Court of Justice, or they have at least been very reluctant to ask the Court in 
Luxembourg for preliminary rulings in the past.
51  
 
The Member States’ constitutional courts are keen to preserve a certain level of 
autonomy and sovereignty, which in their view could be lost if placed under the 
interpretative authority of the Court of Justice. The first reference for a preliminary 
ruling submitted by the Spanish constitutional court lodged on 28 July 2011 came 
thus rather unexpected and was received as puzzling but welcomed.
52 The legal 
issue in the case of Melloni  concerns the validity and interpretation of a rule 
concerning the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in respect to the 
protection of fundamental rights. The instrument of the EAW as established by 
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 provides for an 
extradition system between the Member States that permits judicial authorities to 
request the surrender of suspected or sentenced persons for prosecution purposes, 
or in order to ensure the execution of a criminal sentence.
53 The crux in Melloni 
relates to the delicate question of how the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions – upon which the EAW mechanism is based – is compatible with the right 
to a fair trial of constitutional value, and the same right as guaranteed under EU 
law.
54 One may wonder whether this “entering into dialogue” with the Court of Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                      
einer unionsrechtlichen Solange-Doktrin gegenüber Mitgliedsstaaten”, 72 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2012), 46-78, pp. 66-77.  
50 Paul Craig/Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law (5th ed. OUP, Oxford 2011), p. 442.  
51 See Marta Cartabia, “Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously”, 5 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2009), 5-31, p. 25; see also 2011 Annual Report of the Court of Justice for an overview on 
the new references for preliminary rulings, pp. 119-121. 
52  Aida Torres Perez, “Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest Warrant: The Spanish 
Constitutional Court knocking on Luxembourg’s Door”, 8 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2012), 105-127, pp. 119-122; pending Case C-399/11 Melloni, the hearing is scheduled for 3 July 
2012. 
53 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
surrender procedures between the Member States as amended by Council Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009.  
54 For a legal analysis on the multilevel fundamental rights protection in the EU legal order and the 
significance of Article 53 EU Charter in the Melloni case, see Clemens Ladenburger, FIDE 2012 –   15 
will incite more national constitutional courts to ask the highest judicial authority in the 
EU for interpretative guidance. Yet, de facto some current developments seem to 
suggest the opposite.    
3.3. A Relationship of Cooperation?  
The relationship between the Member States’ constitutional courts and the Court of 
Justice has been addressed by the President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht Prof. 
Dr.  Voßkuhle  on the occasion of delivering a speech on the Bewahrung und 
Erneuerung des Nationalstaats im Lichte der Europäischen Einigung (“the 
preservation and reformation of the nation state in the light of the European 
unification”) to the Hessian Parliament in March 2012.
55 Andreas Voßkuhle argued 
that the ultra vires control of constitutional courts – which he called Notkompetenz 
(emergency competence) – could only be invoked in exceptional cases when an EU 
institution has clearly exceeded its powers. He emphasised the importance of this 
emergency competence that the  German constitutional court developed in the 
Maastricht  judgment.
56  With satisfaction the President of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht gave account of two decisions of the Polish and Czech 
constitutional courts respectively stating that for the first time the ultra vires control 
was put into effect and that the Czech constitutional court declared a decision of the 
Court of Justice inapplicable in the Czech Republic.
57  He appraised these 
developments as “salutary” for the Court of Justice in that it incited the latter not to 
act too expansively, and to consistently take into account the national peculiarities – 
highlighting law as being such a cultural peculiarity of each Member State – and to 
be more reticent. This is why Voßkuhle considered the latent threat of an ultra vires 
decision of the German constitutional court as “reasonable.”  
 
How does one have to assess these considerations of the President of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht? The autonomy and the primacy of EU law vis-à-vis 
national law has been a reality for almost 50 years, and which has to be regarded as 
a milestone in the European integration process. There is no doubt that a fruitful and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Session on “Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon – The interaction between the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights and National Constitutions”, 
Institutional Report, pp. 24-26. 
55  Andreas Voßkuhle, speech “Bewahrung und Erneuerung des Nationalstaats im Lichte der 
Europäischen Einigung” delivered to the Hessischer Landtag in Wiesbaden on 1 March 2012.  
56 BVerfGE 89, 155 of 12 October 1993. 
57 See Judgment of the constitutional court of the Czech Republic, No. Pl. US 5/12 of 14 February 2012, 
the so-called  “Slovak pensions”  case; a follow-up reference for a preliminary ruling of the Czech 
supreme administrative court has been made on 9 May 2012, see Case C-253/12 JC.  
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smooth communication between the Member States’ courts and the Court of Justice 
is very useful but remains a major challenge. The question arises whether 
statements that challenge fundamental principles of the EU legal order as well as the 
authority of the Court of Justice are supportive in this respect. Is it constructive to 
instruct Luxembourg with a wagging finger  from Karlsruhe about “salutary” and 
“reassuring” emergency competences of national constitutional courts with a view to 
seek affirmation among one’s peers? It makes a significant difference whether a 
national constitutional court postulates reservations and emergency competences 
merely in an abstract and restrained way, or whether, such as in the case of the 
Czech Republic, a decision of the Court of Justice is criticised – without warning and 
without addressing a second preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice – as a paragon 
of ignorance and a product of an unfair procedure, and repudiated as ultra vires. One 
has to keep in mind that it was the German constitutional court that has shaped the 
concept of constitutional pluralism as outlined above. The position that the EU is not 
capable to effectively protect higher – and constitutionally guaranteed – fundamental 
values in the Member States is comprehensible against the backdrop of Germany's 
history and the associated high priority of the catalogue of fundamental rights set out 
in the German constitution of 1949. The legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the EU’s imminent accession to the European Convention of Human 




Interestingly enough, the German constitutional court defined in the Maastricht 
judgment the exercise of its jurisdiction on the application of secondary Community 
law as a “relationship of cooperation” in respect to the Court of Justice –  as 
mentioned by Voßkuhle. It is therefore not a tug-of-war but cooperation that is today 
–  maybe more than ever –  necessary and desirable. What matters is that the 
democratic basics of the Union are extended inline with the integration and that a 
vivid democracy is maintained in the integration process within the Member States.
59 
This much-cited “relationship of cooperation” forms also the basis of a recent 
decision of the constitutional court of Austria.
60 In its reasoning the latter court points 
                                                            
58 See, however, also the judgment of the German constitutional court in respect to the Treaty of Lisbon 
(BVerfGE 123, 267 of 30 June 2009), in which the court conditioned Germany's ratification of the 
latter Treaty on more participation rights of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and stipulated certain 
national powers and limits for EU integration.   
59  BVerfGE 89,  155 of 12 October 1993, at C.I.2.b.1: “Entscheidend ist, daß die demokratischen 
Grundlagen der Union schritthaltend mit der Integration ausgebaut werden und auch im Fortgang 
der Integration in den Mitgliedstaaten eine lebendige Demokratie erhalten bleibt.” 
60 Judgment of the constitutional court of Austria (Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich), VfGH U 466/11-
18 und U 1836/11, of 14 March 2012.   17 
out that the EU Charter must be regarded in the same way as the Austrian 
constitution in procedures in which Union law is of relevance. With regard to two 
principles of Union law, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of 
equivalence, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights must be used as the standard of 
scrutiny by the judges of the constitutional court. As a consequence, fundamental 
rights that are protected by the EU Charter are also constitutionally protected rights 
that can be claimed before the constitutional court. If, in the context of legal 
proceedings, the constitutional court is of the opinion that a law is in violation with the 
EU Charter, the Court will repeal the law in question. The Austrian constitutional 
court stresses in this regard that it will take this step without prior consultation with 
the Court of Justice only if the underlying subject-matter is unequivocal. In case the 
constitutional court has doubts concerning the interpretation of the EU Charter, the 
court will ask the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling to clarify the issue at hand.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
As this contribution has demonstrated the ‘checks and balances’  of the Union’s 
system has been improved by the Treaty of Lisbon. We have shown, however, that 
this does not mean that all institutional problems have been resolved by the current 
legal framework. How will Europe’s future look like? In a Union of 27 – or soon 28 – it 
is crucial that the Member States and the EU act in concert to lay the foundation for a 
common future in Europe. A Europe of the citizens requires, as Chancellor Merkel 
has pointed out, an improved institutional balance between the Union organs that is 
based on coordinated action. Just as important is a cooperative relationship between 
national courts and the Court of Justice, which is mutually beneficial for a 
establishing a coherent legal system in the EU. The active, participatory attitude of 
national constitutional courts is not only highly preferable but necessary. In this 
regard, it has been stated that “[B]oth the national constitutional systems and the 
European constitutional systems could pay too high a price if their courts shut 
themselves out of the European constitutional dialogue […] [P]reliminary ruling could 
be a valid tool in bringing traditions, experience, reasoning and different points of 
view before the court of Justice on the part of the national constitutional courts. In 
short, it is the simplest way to keep pluralism alive within the European 
constitution.”
61 By calling upon the Court of Justice, the Spanish constitutional court 
has in Melloni for the first time overcome its previous reluctance to engage into a 
                                                            
61  Marta Cartabia, “Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously”, 5 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2009), 5-31, p. 25.   18 
legal dialogue of great importance. There is hope that other constitutional courts in 
the EU will learn a lesson  from this initiative despite the recent opposing 
developments that have shaped the debates on the Union’s constitutional order. The 
issue as to how a genuine institutional balance of the EU can be attained that entails 
a more efficient, transparent and democratic course of action of the Union should in 
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